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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates the effects of religion on a broad set of development 
outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa. We regroup these outcomes into three broad 
categories, namely, development process outcomes (growth, investment, conflict, 
and government quality), institutional outcomes (property rights and the rule of 
law) and social development outcomes (social and gender protection). Using two 
new measures of religion – religious fractionalization (RELFRAC) and religious 
polarization (RELPOL), alongside the traditional measure of religious diversity, our 
results suggest that broadly speaking, religion or religious diversity has no 
statistically significant impact on the institutional and social aspects of 
development in sub-Saharan Africa. However, our findings do suggest that religion 
has important effects on the development process through its effects on 
investment. The analysis suggests that African policy-makers need to pay attention 
to the changing religious dynamics and increasing religious polarization of African 
societies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We can broadly view institutions as comprising of established rules, 
norms and strategies which influence the kind of social interactions that occur in a 
particular society (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995; Ostrom, 2005; Hodgson, 2006). 
Institutions encourage particular types of behaviours while at the same time 
discouraging other types (Hogson, 2006). Research has demonstrated that the 
quality of institutions influences the rate of economic growth and the level of 
economic development in a society (North, 1989; Kimenyi and Mbaku, 2003; 
Rodrick et al., 2004). 
 Since Adam Smith, the impact of religion on the socio-economic 
and political development of nations has received considerable attention in the 
economic development literature. In his “Theory of Moral Sentiments”3, Smith 
outlined the important role of religion in public life (notably, as a complement in 
the exercise of public authority and in reducing information asymetries)while in his 
famous book “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations”, 
Smith raised the problem of religious diversity. He argued that religious diversity 
increases religious competition which in turn improves the quality of supply of 
religious goods4.  
Several contemporary authors have dwelled on different aspects of the 
religion – development nexus. For instance, Tavares & Wacziarg (2001) consider 
the relationship between religion and democracy5; Lewer & Vand den Berg (2007) 
and Helble (2007) focus on religion and trade; Sacerdote & Glaeser (2008) focus 
on religion and education; Barro & McCleary (2003), Allesina et al (2003),Barro 
(1997), Sala-I-Martin (1997), Montalvoa & Reynal-Querol (2003) consider religion 
and growth (or development); while Iannaccone (1998) and McCleary & Barro 
(2006) investigate religion and other behaviors.   
It is now widely accepted that the spread of religion could be a double-
edged sword. On the one hand, it could facilitate economic development through 
the concomitant process of evangelism, religious liberty, mass education, mass 
printing, and support to civil society organizations, which in turn contribute to the 
                                                
3 For an exhaustive account of Smith’s arguments see Anderson (1988). 
4Recent authors, notably, Barro & McCleary (2003) have expounded on this axiom. 
5 Woodberry (2012) focuses on one aspect of religion – missionary protestant christianism - to argue 
that religion helps entrench stable democracies around the world, by promoting mass education, mass 
printing, newspapers and voluntary organizations. Similar contributions have been made by Nunn 
(2010) and Anderson (2004). 
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entrenchment of democratic institutions and the rule of law. On the other hand, 
religious intransigience or polarization could undermine development by 
sidelining the importance of secular (western) education6 and also by promoting 
a culture of violence and terrorism.  
Over the past two centuries, Sub-Saharan Africa’s (henceforth, SSA) 
religious landscape has undergone profound changes from a monolithic African 
traditional religious7 society to an incereasingly polarized religious society. In 
1900, 75 percent of Africans professed their faith in African traditional religions, 
whilst the Christian and Muslim populations put together constituted less than a 
quarter of the total population, according to historical estimates from the World 
Religion Database. However, by 2010, this trend has significantly reversed in favor 
of the Christian and Muslim populations which now occupy about 86 percent of 
the total SSA population implying that less than 15 percent of Africans continue 
to profess their faith in African traditional religions8. There are notable differences 
even within the non-traditional African religious group. The Christian population 
seemed to have witnessed the most dramatic growth since 1950, from a share of 
the population of about 25 percent to nearly 60 percent in 2010, see Figure 1 
below. In international comparative perspective, SSA is now home to about one-
in-five of all the Christians in the world (21 percent) and more than one-in-seven 
of the world's Muslims (15 percent), World Religion Database.  
In the light of this historical evidence, two important questions merit the 
consideration of scholars. First, the likely impact that these changing religious 
dynamics could have on SSA development trajectory and second, how the 
increasing religious polarization of African societies is expected to impact on 
development outcomes. Our study aims at answering both of these questions9.  
Figure 1: Evolution of the Sub-Saharan African Religious Landscape 
                                                
6 The Boko Haram islamic religious sect in northern Nigeria is known to publicly advocate against 
western education. 
7 African traditional religions are the  diverse sets of traditional belief systems rooted in the anscetral 
traditions and cultures of African people. Its origins could be traced far back into pre-colonial Africa. 
8 In spite of the observed dramatic  decline in the share of African traditional religions, the influence 
of the latter on the Christian and Muslim religions can not be discounted completely, as some African 
Christians, especially those in indigenous African Christian Churches continue to mix their native African 
religious conceptions and ideologies with Christianity. In this sense, it could be argued that the 
observed dramatic decline in African traditional religions is over-stated.  
9To keep the analysis simple, we would in this paper ignore the likely influence of the worldwide 
growing heterogeneity within the Christian religious family, which was traditionally composed mainly 
of Catholics and Protestants but is now widely dispersed into Catholics, Protestants, Pentecostals, 
Charismatics and Momons. 
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Two important contributions to the literature are to be derived from this 
study. First, the originality of our study derives from the use of two new 
explanatory variables, not used before by previous researchers, to proxy for 
religion:religious fractionalization (or diversity) and religious polarization. Second, 
unlike previous studies that have focussed mainly on an aspect of development 
(either democracy, trade, education or growth), our study intends to be more 
broader and comprehensive in the dimensions of development considered. 
Furthermore, by limiting the scope of the study to SSA, we abstract from the 
problem of heterogeneity which plagues previous studies.  
The results of this study can be briefly summarized as follows: 1/ broadly 
speaking, religion or religious diversity has no statistically significant impact on the 
institutional and social aspects of development in SSA. However, our findings do 
suggest that religion has important effects on the development process through 
its effects on investment. In particular, our parameter estimates suggest that both 
religious polarization (RELPOL)and religious fractionalization (RELFRAC) have 
economically and statistically significant effects on investment in SSA, although 
their effects are opposite in nature: while religious fractionalization significantly 
reduces investment, religious polarization potentially increases investment. 2/ at a 
disaggregated level, our empirical study does not suggest the superiority of any 
one single religion, although Christian faiths tend to show positive (but statistically 
insignificant) association with development outcomes. The rest of the paper is 
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organized as follows: Section 2 presents the data while section 3 presents and 
discusses the statistical results. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
DATA 
Our dependent variable is development and we consider both the socio-
economic and institutional dimensions of development.The economic dimensions 
of development are captured by economic growth (proxied by the natural 
logarithm of real per capita GDP); investment (proxied by the investment share in 
real GDP); and the quality of government (proxied by the share of government 
expenditure in real GDP). Data for these variables are obtained from the  Penn 
World Table 6.2.The social dimensions of development are captured by an index 
of social protection (obtained from the Mo Ibrahim Foundation) which is a multi-
dimensional index capturing several aspects of social development.  
We capture the institutional dimensions of development by including 
measures for property rights obtained from the Heritage Foundation, measures of 
the rule of law obtained from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (2009) and 
measures of conflicts. In line with the tradition in the literature, notably, Bertocchi 
& Guerzoni (2012), we proxy conflict by the number of years a country witnessed 
armed conflicts (data obtained from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset) 
andthe number of revolutions (data obtained from Banks (2001) dataset).  
Our main explanatory variable is religion and like the dependent 
variable, there exist several dimensions of religion. The tradition in the literature, 
(see notably, Barro (1997), Sala-I-Martin (1997), La Porta et al. (1999), Tavares & 
Wacziarg (2001), Helble (2007) and Kodila-Tedika (2012)) is to consider the 
relative share of membership of each religious grouping in the total population as 
proxy for both religion and religious diversity. We follow the tradition by utilising 
the proportion of population ascribing to a particular religion as indicator of 
religious diversity and we utilize the dataset used in La Porta et al. (1999). 
Worth while mentioning that some new proxies of religious diversity have 
been used in recent studies. Alesina et al. (2002) have proposed a new measure 
of religious fractionalization which they utilized in their study and found that 
religious fractionalization affects the quality of government but not necessarily 
long term growth. Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2000), Reynal-Querol (2002b) and 
Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2003)  have also proposed new measures for 
polarization (POL) and religious diversity and suggest that religious polarization 
might well capture the extent of religious conflict better than religious diversity: 
“The index POL ranges from 0 to 1. Opposite to what happens with the  
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fragmentation index, polarization reaches a maximum when there are two religious 
groups of equal size. In this type of index, what matters is not only how many 
groups there are but also if they view other groups as a potential threat for their 
interests. For a given number of groups, the threat is higher the larger the size of 
another group relative to the size of the reference group. Therefore the 
polarization index can reflect potential religious conflict in a society better than 
the fragmentation index.” (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2003: 202-203).  
It is worth noting that the index of religious diversity proposed by 
Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2003) is very strongly correlated (at coefficient 0.83) 
with that proposed by Alesina et al. (2002). Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2003) 
argue that their index of polarization is more suited in measuring the impact of 
religious diversity on economic growth. Small wonder its appeal to several recent 
studies notably, Montalvoa & Reynal-Querol (2003), Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 
(2003, 2005a, 2005b). We employ these new measures of religious diversity and 
polarization in our robustness checks. 
We also use a number of control variables, which some other studies have 
used as explanatory variables. This is especially true in the case of the trade 
variable (captured by the average share of exports and imports in real GDP). We 
also control for the fertility rate (natural logarithm of number of children per 
woman obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators 2010 on-
line version), government effectiveness (obtained from Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (2009)), human capital (proxied by primary and secondary enrollment 
rates courtesy World Bank's World Development Indicators, 2010 on-line version) 
and inflation (using the consumer price index provided by the IMF).  
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Development process 
In this section, we discuss the comparative empirical performance of 
indices of religious fractionalization and polarization on different dimensions of 
development. The purpose of this section is to analyze the effect of different 
dimensions of religious diversity on economic development and to compare the 
empirical performance of fractionalization indices relative to polarization.  The 
estimation procedure for the direct channel (growth equation) and the indirect 
channels (investment, government consumption share in GDP and conflict) is the 
seeminglyunrelated regression estimator (SURE) commonly used in recent 
empirical growth studies. There is at least one issue that could potentially affect 
the estimation of thestandard deviation of the parameters. 
Our specification in Table 1 follows that in Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 
(2005b). Table 1 shows the comparative effects of religious polarization (RELPOL) 
andreligious fractionalization (RELFRAC) on growth (per capita GDP), investment, 
the probability of civil wars (conflict) and government quality (GOV). In the growth 
regression, we include the following control variables in column 1 gross school 
enrollment rates, government expenditure, investment, number of revolutions, 
trade, inflation, rule of law, and fertility rates. While in the investment regression, 
we control for conflict, human capital, government expenditure, and inflation. In 
the conflict regression, we control for rule of law and fertility rates. In the quality 
of government regression, we control for rule of law and conflict.  
The results in column 1 of Table 1 show that neither religious polarization 
(RELPOL)nor religious fractionalization (RELFRAC) has a statistically significant 
direct effect on growth, conflict, the quality of government. The finding of an 
insignificant effect of religious fractionalization on growth is thus consistent with 
Alesina et al. (2003). However, our findings suggestthat both RELPOL and 
RELFRAC have economically and statistically significant effects on investment in 
SSA, although their effects are opposite in nature: while religious fractionalization 
significantly reduces investment, religious polarization potentially increases 
investment. The observation of a positive association between religious 
polarization and investment can be interpreted along the lines of Adam Smith’s 
logic of religious competition driving the supply of religious goods, while the 
negative association of religious fractionalization with investment can be 
interpreted along the lines of Easterly & Levine’s (1997) logic of ethnic diversity 
reducing the supply of public goods. It is worth noting that the finding of a positive 
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association between religious polarization and investment is in contradiction to 
the findings by Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2005b)who find investment to 
decrease with religious polarization. 
Table 1. Religion and Development  
Seemingly unrelated regression OLS
Per capita GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
RELFRAC -1.48
(1.30) 
-.13    
(.39) 
RELPOL .87   
(.92) 
-.14
(.27) 
Catholics .00
(.00) 
Muslims -.00
(.00) 
Protestants -.00
(.01) 
Obs 40 41 40 47
Parms 12 11 11 8
RMSE .38 .41 .39 .51
R-sq 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.76
Investment 
RELFRAC -27.67***   
(9.59) 
-1.93 
(3.29) 
RELPOL 18.74***  
(6.88) 
-.14
(2.37) 
Catholics .06
(.05) 
Muslims -.01
(.03) 
Protestants .027
(.06) 
Obs 40 41 40 47
Parms 8 7 3 6
RMSE 3.24 3.61 3.56 5.31
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R-sq 0.42 0.33 0.29 0.19
Conflict 
RELFRAC 1.30
(5.93) 
1.14  
(1.99) 
RELPOL -.19
(4.14) 
 .68
(1.43) 
Catholics  .01   
(.02) 
Muslims  -.00
(.02) 
Protestants  -.02    
(.03) 
Obs 40 41 40 47
Parms 4 3 3 5
RMSE 2.25 2.23 2.24 2.27
R-sq 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.25
GOV
RELFRAC 34.24
(29.99) 
-3.66   
(10.27) 
RELPOL -28.79   
(20.93) 
 -6.37
(7.34) 
Catholics  .15
(.13) 
Muslims  .04
(.09) 
Protestants  -.07
(.20) 
Obs 40 41 40 47
Parms 4 3 3 5
RMSE 11.40 11.54 11.59 12.61
R-sq 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.13
All regressions include a constant term.  Standard errors are in parentheses. * p=10%; ** p=5%; *** 
p=1% 
As Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2005b) have indicated, the results of 
column 1 are likely to be biased owing to the very high degree of correlation 
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between religious fractionalization and religious polarization (see Figure 1 below). 
In effect, the coefficient of pearson of the two variables is 95.1.  
Figure. 1 Correlation between RELPOL and RELFRA 
 
To minimize the problem of multicollinearity, and following Montalvo & 
Reynal-Querol (2005b), we proceed to introducing religious fractionalization 
(RELFRAC) and religious polarization (RELPOL) one at a time, in columns (2) and 
(3) respectively. We maintain the same estimation technique and other control 
variables as in column (1). 
We observe that RELFRAC maintains its previous sign in most of the 
regressions (excepting the government quality regression where its sign changes) 
and also looses its statistical significance in the investment regression. RELPOL also 
ceases to be statistically insignificant in the investment regression and changes sign 
in almost all the regressions suggesting the high sensitivity of these results to 
different controls.  
In column (4) we use a different estimation strategy (OLS) and the 
traditional measure of religious diversity (that is the proportion of population 
ascribing to a particular religion). We only maintain in column (4) estimation those 
control variables that were found statistically significant in column (1). In the 
growth regression, these include, the fertility rate, trade, investment, government 
expenditure and conflict. In the investment regression, these include, government 
expenditure and human capital. In the conflict regression, these include, the 
fertility rate, and rule of law. In the government quality regression, these include 
conflict and rule of law.   
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We find that the two main Christian religious groups (catholicism and 
protestantism) are positively correlated with investment, while the muslim faith is 
negatively correlated with investment. Grier (2007) also finds protestantism to 
have a positive association with investment. Given the lack of statistical significance 
of most of the variables in column (4), we spare the reader of any discussion of 
these results but worth mentioning that, contrary to Kuran (1997), the hypothesis 
of the muslim religion negatively affecting dvelopment cannot be completely 
ruled out in sub-Saharan Africa.  
Institutions 
The empirical evidence on the religion – institutions nexus is inconclusive. 
On the one hand, there are those who claim that institutions are endogenous to 
religion, see notably, McCleary & Barro (2006) while there are those who claim it 
is exogenous, see notably, La Porta et al. (1999), Levine (2005, Ayyagari Demirgüç-
Kunt& Maksimovic (2006).Recently, Berggren &Bjørnskov (2012)used a measure 
of religiosity in a cross-section of 112 countries to find a negative association 
between religion and institutional outcome variables. For consistency with the 
literature, we use similar institutional variables as in Berggren &Bjørnskov (2012).  
We employ ordinary least squares estimation in the results presented in 
Table 2. To correct for likely heteroskedasticity, we present white-corrected 
standard errors. In spite of the great disparity in number of observations across 
models, the results of our cross-section analysis remain largely valid.  
In Table 2 we estimate the effects of RELFRAC and RELPOL on the 
following two institutional aspects of development – property rights and rule of 
law. In both regressions (property rights and rule of law) we make use of the 
following four control variables namely, government expenditure, trade, real per 
capita GDP (in natural logs), and human capital (secondary enrollment rates).  
None of the variables religious fractionalization (RELFRAC) nor religious 
polarization (RELPOL) has a statistically significant effect on both property rights 
and the rule of law, when both are estimated together in column (1) or when each 
is estimated independently of the other in columns (2) and (3). Even after 
employing the standard measure of religion in column (4), religion does not 
appear to have a statistically significant effect on either dimension of institutions 
considered. 
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Table 2. Religion and Institutions 
Property Rights 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
RELFRAC 44.73   
(30.38) 
-1.07    
(9.88) 
RELPOL -35.82    
(22.82) 
-6.916   
(7.62) 
Catholics -.01
(.12) 
Muslims .01
(.10) 
Protestants .00
(.16) 
Obs 39 39 40 45
R-sq 0.42 0.37 0.42 0.37
Rule of Law 
RELFRAC 1.20
(1.49) 
.11 
(.50) 
RELPOL -.82
(1.03) 
-.05   
(.37) 
Catholics -.00
(.00) 
Muslims -.00   
(.00) 
Protestants -.00
(.01) 
Obs 40 41 41 47
R-sq 0.42 0.46 0.41 0.45
All regressions are estimated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction. All regressions include 
a constant term.  Standard errors are in parentheses. Legend: * p=10%; ** p=5%; *** p=1% 
Social Indicators of Development 
We also use ordinary least squares estimation for the results presented 
in Table 3. As before, we correct for likely heteroskedasticity by presenting white-
corrected standard errors.  
Table 3 aims to estimate the effects of RELFRAC and RELPOL on the 
following two social dimensions of development – social protection and gender 
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protection. In the social protection regression we make use of the following four 
control variables namely, government expenditure, government effectiveness, real 
per capita GDP (in natural logs), and human capital (secondary enrollment rates). 
In the gender protection regression we make use of the following four control 
variables namely, rule of law (to capture democracy), government effectiveness, 
real per capita GDP (in natural logs), and human capital (secondary enrollment 
rates). 
Again, the results in Table 3 suggest neither religious fractionalization nor 
religious polarization has a statistically significant effect on social development 
indicators in sub-Saharan Africa, whether both variables are estimated together 
(column 1) or independently of the other (columns 2 & 3). Column (4) which uses 
the traditional measure of religion finds one interesting result: there is a positive 
and statistically significant effect of catholicism on gender protection, as opposed 
to the negative but statistically insignificant effect of muslim adherence. 
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Table 3. Religion and Social Development 
Social Protection 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
RELFRAC -25.27   
(20.98) 
-1.29
(9.93) 
RELPOL 17.57
(15.32 ) 
1.45 
(6.87) 
Catholics .07
(.06) 
Muslim .02
(.08) 
Protestants -.14
(.15) 
Obs 41 41 42 47
Parms 6 6 6 7
R-sq 0.78 0.77 0.79 0.74
Gender Protection
RELFRAC -35.91   
(26.26) 
-5.74    
(7.26) 
RELPOL 21.67   
(17.18) 
-.05   
(.37) 
Catholics .13*   
(.07) 
Muslims -.00   
.(06) 
Protestants .01
(.09) 
Obs 41 42 41 47
Parms 6 6 6 7
R-sq 0.57 0.57 0.54 0.65
 
All regressions are estimated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction. All regressions include 
a constant term.  Standard errors are in parentheses. Legend: * p=10%; ** p=5%; *** p=1% 
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CONCLUSION 
Our inquiry has been to investigate the effects of different dimensions of 
religion on a broad set of development outcomes. We regroup these outcomes 
into three broad categories, namely, development process outcomes (growth, 
investment, conflict, and government quality), institutional outcomes (property 
rights and the rule of law) and social development outcomes (social and gender 
protection). We utilized two new measures of religion – religious fractionalization 
(RELFRAC) and religious polarization (RELPOL), alongside the traditional measure 
(the share of population ascribing to a particular religion) as proxy for religion or 
religious diversity.  
Our results suggest that broadly speaking, religion or religious diversity 
has no statistically significant impact on the institutional and social aspects of 
development in SSA. However, our findings do suggest that religion has important 
effects on the development process through its effects on investment. In 
particular, our parameter estimates suggest that both religious polarization 
(RELPOL)and religious fractionalization (RELFRAC) have economically and 
statistically significant effects on investment in SSA, although their effects are 
opposite in nature: while religious fractionalization significantly reduces 
investment, religious polarization potentially increases investment. The 
observation of a positive association between religious polarization and 
investment can be interpreted along the lines of Adam Smith’s logic of religious 
competition driving the supply of religious goods, while the negative association 
of religious fractionalization with investment can be interpreted along the lines of 
Easterly & Levine’s (1997) logic of ethnic diversity reducing the supply of public 
goods in Africa. We also find a positive and statistically significant effect of 
catholicism on gender protection, while we do not find any statistically significant 
relationship between the muslim religion and gender protection, even though we 
observe an inverse relationship. Given the ambivalence of this finding in light of 
the strong correlation between RELPOL and RELFRAC, an immediate line of 
further research is to try to unravel the exact nature of the relationship between 
these two variables and investment.  
In light of our fundamental research question, African policy-makers 
need to pay attention to the changing religious dynamics and increasing religious 
polarization of African societies. 
  
113
JOURNAL OF AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT 
   
REFERENCE 
Alesina, A., Devleeschauer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S. and Wacziarg R. (2003), 
“Fragmentation,” Journal of Economic Growth, VIII, 155–194. 
Ayyagari, M., Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Maksimovic, V. (2006). “How Well Do 
Institutional Theories Explain Firms’ Perceptions of Property Rights?” 
Review of Financial Studies 21:1833–871.   
Anderson, John. 2004. Does God Matter, and if so Whose God? Religion and 
Democratization. Democratization, Vol. 11: 192-217 
Banks, A. S (2011) Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive. Jerusalem: 
DatabanksInternational. 
Barro, R. and McCleary, R, (2005). “Which Countries Have State Religions?”,The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(4), 1331-1370.  
Barro, R. and McCleary, R. (2002). “Religion and Political Economy in 
anInternational Panel,” NBER Working Paper 8931. Cambridge: National 
Bureau of EconomicResearch. 
Barro, R. and McCleary, R.(2003), “Religion and Economic Growth across 
Countries”, American Sociological Review, 68(5),  pp. 760-781. 
Barro, R. (1997). The Determinants of Economic Growth. MIT Press. 
Bellinger, G. J., (2000), Encyclopédie des religions, Librairie générale française, 
Paris, coll. « Le Livre de poche ». 
Berggren, N. and Bjørnskov, C. (2012), “Does Religiosity Promote Property Rights 
and the Rule of Law?”,  ECON-ASB working papers 2012-08. 
Bertocchi, G. and Guerzoni, A. (2012), “Growth, History, or Institutions: What 
Explains State Fragility in Sub-Saharan Africa?”, Journal of Peace 
Research. 49(6), 769-783 
Blum, U. and Dudley, L. (2001). “Religion and Economic Growth: Was Weber 
Right?” Journal of Evolutionary Economics 11, no. 2: 207–30. 
Glaeser, E.L. and Sacerdote, B. I. (2008). “Education and Religion”,Journal of Human 
Capital, 2(2), 188-215. 
Grier, R. (1997). “The Effect of Religion on Economic Development: A Cross 
National Study of 63 Former Colonies,” Kyklos 50, no. 1: 47–62. 
Helble, M. (2007), “Is God Good for Trade?”, Kyklos 60(3 ), 385-413 
Iannaccone, L. R. (1998). “Introduction to the Economics of Religion,” Journal 
ofEconomic Literature 36, no. 3: 1465–96. 
Kodila-Tedika, O. (2012). “Determinants of Peace: A Cross-Country Analysis”, The 
Economic Research Guardian, 2(2):180-200.  
114
KODILA-TEDIKA AND AGBOR: RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
Kuran, T. (1997). “Islam and Underdevelopment: An Old Puzzle Revisited,” Journal 
ofInstitutional and Theoretical Economics 153: 41–71. 
La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A, Vishny R (1999). “The Quality of 
Government”. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 15(1): 222-
279. 
Levine, R. (2005). “Law, Endowments and Property Rights”. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 19:61–88.   
Lewer, J.J. and Vand den Berg, H.(2007), “Estimating the institutional and network 
effects of religions cultures on international trade”, Kyklos  60(2), 255-
277. 
McCleary, R. M. & Barro, R.J. (2006). “Religion and Economy”,Journal of Economic 
Perspectives,20(2), 49-72. 
Montalvo J.G, and Reynal-Querol, M. (2005a), “Ethnic Polarization, Potential 
Conflict, and Civil Wars”, American Economic Review. 95(3), 796-816, 
June. 
Montalvo J.G, and Reynal-Querol, M. (2005b), “Ethnic Diversity and Economic 
Development”, Journal of Development Economic, 76, 293-323. 
Montalvo, J.G., Reynal-Querol, M.(2000). “The effect of ethnic and religious 
conflict on growth”, IVIE WP-EC 2000-04. Anupdated version can be 
found in http: / /www.wcfio.harvard.edu/programs/ prpes 
Montalvoa,J.G. and Reynal-Querol, M. (2003), “Religious polarization and 
economic development”, Economics Letters, 80, 201–210. 
Nunn, Nathan, 2010. Christianity in Africa. Harvard University, Unpublished 
paper. 
Reynal-Querol, M. (2002b). “A contribution to the measurement of religious 
diversity”, http: / /www.wcfio.harvard.edu/programs/ prpes 
Sala-I-Martin, X.(1997). “I just run two million regressions”. American Economic 
Review 87 (2), 178–183. 
Smith, A. (1791). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 
6thed., London, Strahan. 
Tavares, J. and Wacziarg, R.(2001). “How democracy fosters growth”. European 
Economic Review 45, 1341–1378 
Woodberry, R.D., (2012). The Missionary Roots of Liberal Democracy, American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 106, No. 2(May).  
 
 
115
JOURNAL OF AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT 
   
Appendix A. Summary Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐+‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
        edup |        48    101.6458    27.49274         33        173 
        edus |        48      40.075    24.34726          8        112 
protection~e |        48    49.14792    16.01687          0       90.3 
      cath80 |        48      27.175    27.16996          0       95.9 
      musl80 |        48    28.65625    33.69785          0       99.8 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐+‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
      prot80 |        47    13.32553    14.95508          0       64.2 
      relpol |        41    .7015111    .2974974   .0039959   .9792523 
     relfrac |        42    .4267098    .1965609    .001998    .647864 
         rev |        96    .2552703    .3748203          0   1.333333 
     governm |        95    24.31116    13.38962   2.602222   85.58665 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐+‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
      invest |        95    9.059193    5.783989   2.328974   34.97275 
       trade |        95    73.78535    38.67534    2.01522   181.1759 
     inflimf |        93     86.2287    454.5387   1.263875   3945.127 
fertilityr~g |        96    1.644109    .2853525   .6773081   2.043434 
kkgovernef~t |        96    2.784375     .606536       1.41       4.23 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐+‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
   kkrulelaw |        96    2.764687     .685963       1.23       4.34 
realpercap~g |        94    7.334436    .8997084   5.616685   9.690198 
droitdepro~n |        46    31.52174    13.97894          5         70 
genreibrah~m |        48    50.36945    13.90579       18.9       74.5 
      confln |        96    1.791667    2.591146          0          8 
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Appendix B. Definition of the variables 
 
edup   |        taux brut d’inscription au primaire 
        edus |        taux brut d’inscription au secondaire 
protection~e |        protection sociale 
      cath80 |         
      musl80 |         
      prot80 |         
      relpol |      religious polarization   
     relfrac |        religious fractionalization. 
         rev |        Révolution 
     governm |        Taille du gouvernement  
invest |        Investment  
       trade |        Ouverture 
     inflimf |        Inflation 
fertilityr~g |        taux de fertilité en log (Number of children 
per woman (log))  
kkgovernef~t |        Efficacité gouvernementale 
   kkrulelaw |        Etat de droit 
realpercap~g |        Log du PIB per capita 
droitdepro~n |        droit de prropriété 
genreibrah~m |        genre 
      confln |        conflit  
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